A Benign Prior Restraint Rule for Public School Classroom Speech by Bauries, Scott R.
University of Kentucky
UKnowledge
Law Faculty Scholarly Articles Law Faculty Publications
11-2015
A Benign Prior Restraint Rule for Public School
Classroom Speech
Scott R. Bauries
University of Kentucky College of Law, sba223@uky.edu
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you.
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/law_facpub
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Education Law Commons, and the First Amendment
Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Faculty Publications at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law
Faculty Scholarly Articles by an authorized administrator of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.
Recommended Citation
Scott R. Bauries, A Benign Prior Restraint Rule for Public School Classroom Speech, 2 Educ. L. & Pol'y Rev. 88 (2015).
Volume 2 Education Law & Policy Review 2015 
88 
 
A Benign Prior Restraint Rule for Public School 
Classroom Speech  
 
Scott R. Bauries* 
 
 
  
 
     The classroom is perhaps the most vexing speech location in all of First 
Amendment law.  The doctrine of the First Amendment has generally 
regarded the classroom as a nonpublic, or closed, forum for the purposes 
of both student and teacher speech,
1
 but that same doctrine has developed 
completely different sets of protection for these two categories of 
speakers.
2
  The doctrine that has developed in the classroom goes beyond 
the doctrine that normally governs other closed or nonpublic forums, 
where at least viewpoint discrimination is not generally permitted.
3
   
     The law of the classroom allows for restrictions on the speech—both its 
content and its viewpoint—of both teachers and students.  Whether, and 
how, these restrictions apply depends in both cases on an initial 
                                                 
* Scott R. Bauries is the Robert G. Lawson Associate Professor of Law at the University 
of Kentucky.  His scholarship focuses on constitutional law and employment law in 
educational contexts. 
1
 There is, of course, a substantial amount of dispute over this question.  See, e.g., Alan 
Brownstein, The Nonforum as a First Amendment Category: Bringing Order out of the 
Chaos of Free-Speech Cases Involving School-Sponsored Activities, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 717 (2009) (recognizing, but rejecting, the characterization and arguing for the 
alternative of the “nonforum” for the classroom and the overall school); Alexis Zouhary, 
The Elephant in the Classroom: A Proposed Framework for Applying Viewpoint 
Neutrality to Student Speech in the Secondary School Setting, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
2227 (2007-2008) (making the point that both schools and school classrooms are 
generally considered to be closed forums).  For the purposes of this brief article, I do not 
attempt to resolve these disputes.  Rather, I fit the Garcetti, Tinker, and Hazelwood 
decisions into their natural forum categories, with Garcetti and Hazelwood representing 
closed forums and Tinker, due to its protections against both content and viewpoint 
discrimination, representing a limited public forum, limited to certain participants 
(students).   
2
 See infra, sections on teachers and students as speakers under the First Amendment.   
3
 See, e.g., Emily Gold Waldman, Returning to Hazelwood’s Core: A New Approach to 
Restrictions on School-Sponsored Speech, 60 FLA. L. REV. 63, 66 (2008) (stating that the 
“question is not whether Hazelwood permits viewpoint discrimination, but when”) 
(emphasis in original); Brownstein, supra note 1 at 722 (“In a nonpublic forum, 
viewpoint-discriminatory speech regulations receive strict scrutiny while content-neutral 
and content-discriminatory regulations are evaluated under a lenient reasonableness 
standard of review”).   
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categorical determination of whether the speech occurred as part of a 
classroom or co-curricular lesson or activity.  For student speech, if this is 
so, then Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier treats the speech as 
having occurred in a closed forum, allowing for regulation of both its 
content and viewpoint based on “legitimate pedagogical concerns.”4  For 
teacher speech, if this is so, then Garcetti v. Ceballos leaves the speech 
completely outside the reach of the First Amendment, regardless of its 
content or viewpoint.
5
  Put another way, the categorical determination that 
speech occurred in the classroom or in a co-curricular activity leads to 
strong deference to the school in the case of student speech, and total 
deference to the school in the case of teacher speech.     
     Neither system of protections (or the lack thereof) adequately respects 
the individual expressive interests that animate the educational process, 
nor do they seriously engage with the inherently expressive and 
discretionary nature of the educational process, and neither will be able to 
be perfected any time soon.
6
  But the unfairness inherent in both sets of 
doctrine could be mitigated through a slight adjustment—limiting their 
application to prior restraints on speech.  For speech that brings some sort 
of punishment or consequence on the speaker after the fact, the First 
Amendment has workable rules that are far superior to those that currently 
govern such speech in the classroom.  For speech that the government 
wishes to suppress before it is made or published, however, the doctrines 
governing both teacher and student speech pose no serious speech 
autonomy or marketplace of ideas problems that are not outweighed by the 
importance of effective and efficient operation of public schools for all. 
 
                                                 
4
 484 U.S. 260 (1988).   
5
 547 U.S. 410 (2006).  
6
 E.g., Paul M. Secunda, Neoformalism and the Reemergence of the Right-Privilege 
Distinction in Employment Law, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 907, 912 (2011) (hereinafter, 
Secunda, Right-Privilege); Paul M. Secunda, Garcetti’s Impact on the First Amendment 
Speech Rights of Federal Employees, 7 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 117, 123 (2008) 
(hereinafter, Secunda, Federal Employees) (“Consistent with Justice Stevens’ dissent in 
Garcetti, I reject the dichotomous, overly-formalistic view of a public employee as either 
being a citizen or worker, but never simultaneously both.”); Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, 
Public Employee Speech Rights Fall Prey to an Emerging Doctrinal Formalism, 15 WM. 
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 1173, 1174, 1192 (2007) (criticizing the unthinking formalism of 
Garcetti); Scott Andrew Felder, Stop the Presses: Censorship and the High School 
Journalist, 29 J.L. & EDUC. 433, 446-48 (2000) (criticizing the Hazelwood test as vague 
and overbroad); S. Elizabeth Wilborn, Teaching the New Three Rs—Repression, Rights, 
and Respect: A Primer of Student Speech Activities, 37 B.C. L. REV. 119, 137 (1995) 
(criticizing the Hazelwood test as standardless).   
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     Accordingly, this Article advances the claim that the First Amendment 
doctrines that apply to the classroom should adopt a benign prior restraint 
rule.
7
  In the case of teacher classroom speech, the Garcetti rule should 
apply where the government’s action in interfering with the speech 
constitutes a prior restraint—the First Amendment should not reach such 
interference.  In cases where a teacher first speaks and then is later 
punished for that speech, however, basic notions of due process and the 
dangers of arbitrary governmental decision making are far more pressing, 
and the Pickering
8
 balance should be applied.   
     In the case of student speech, the Hazelwood rule is well-suited to the 
prior restraint of classroom speech because it encourages the government 
to lay out its legitimate pedagogical justifications for restraint in advance.  
But as with teacher speech, punishing student speech only after it is made 
or published gives rise to significant autonomy interests, due process 
interests, and marketplace of ideas concerns.  Thus, this sort of 
interference should have to contend with the more demanding standard 
articulated in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School 
District.
9
   
     As this Article will show, this proposed rule distinguishing between 
prior restraints and later punishments is not a far step from either the 
Garcetti decision or the Hazelwood decision.  Working within the 
categorical structure of the existing cases, it would also introduce a 
meaningful limit on the tendency of government administrators (and 
sometimes teachers) to act arbitrarily against ideas that they themselves 
disfavor, or more importantly, that powerful voices in the community 
disfavor.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7
 I refer to this proposed rule as “benign” to distinguish it from the traditional idea of the 
public censor on publishers as a prior restraint, which gave rise to the First Amendment’s 
speech protections in the first place.  See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, The Proper Role of the 
Prior Restraint Doctrine in First Amendment Theory, 70 VA. L. REV. 53, 57 (1984).  
Setting up a prior restraint requirement as a way to better protect speech is, of course, 
counter-intuitive, given this history, but it works because the entire doctrine of the First 
Amendment as relates to public school classrooms is also counter-intuitive.   
8
 Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
9
 393 U.S. 503 (1969).  Tinker allows regulation of student speech based on the less 
deferential requirement of “material and substantial disrupt[ion]” of the learning 
environment, a standard that applies to both content and viewpoint discrimination.  Id. at 
513-14.   
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The Classroom and the First Amendment 
 
     It has been said many times by many observers that education is a 
pervasively expressive activity.
10
  But the public school classroom is also, 
paradoxically, a place of restricted expressive rights.
11
  The reasons are 
complex.  Below, I elucidate them, beginning with the place of the 
speech—the classroom—and then moving to the identities of the 
speakers—the teachers and students.  As will become clear, the 
justifications for reduced First Amendment protections for both teachers 
and students are strong, but the current doctrine has privileged these 
justifications too much, resulting in doctrine that is both unthinking and 
needlessly detrimental to the discourse of the classroom.   
 
The Classroom as a Speech Forum
12
  
 
     The Supreme Court has, over the years, developed a set of doctrinal 
restrictions on the basic right of speakers to speak without interference 
from the government.  This basic right might be thought of as the right to 
express oneself anywhere, anytime, in any manner, and on any topic, 
completely free from restriction of any kind.  It is plausible to say that, 
under this baseline right, the Government’s sole role as to the expression 
of individuals and legal entities is to remain completely disinterested.
13
  I 
                                                 
10
 See, e.g., Brownstein, supra note 1, at 808 (“Regulating speech is fundamental to what 
an educator does. Virtually every aspect of a teacher’s responsibilities involves the 
direction and control of speech.”); Scott R. Bauries & Patrick Schach, Coloring Outside 
the Lines:  Garcetti v. Ceballos in the Federal Appellate Courts, 262 EDUC. L. REP. 357 
(2011) (“As an inherently expressive enterprise, education requires its participants to 
engage in speech and expressive conduct.”); JOHN TIFFIN & LALITA RAJASINGHAM, IN 
SEARCH OF THE VIRTUAL CLASS: EDUCATION IN AN INFORMATION SOCIETY 19-47 (1995) 
(describing education as a system of communication with inter-connected networks and 
sub-networks).   
11
 See, e.g., Settle v. Dickson County School Bd., 53 F.3d 152, 155 (6th Cir. 1995) 
(“Where learning is the focus, as in the classroom, student speech may be even more 
circumscribed than in the school newspaper or other open forum”).   
12
 This section derives substantially from an earlier work of mine laying the same 
foundation.  See Scott R. Bauries, Academic Freedom: An Ordinary Concern of the First 
Amendment, 83 MISS. L.J. 677 (2014).  For ease of reading, quotation marks and block 
quotations of this work have been avoided.    
13
 As any student of the First Amendment would quickly realize, this “baseline right” is 
purely hypothetical because the doctrine of the First Amendment consists entirely of 
limitations on it, and has since the beginning.  See, e.g., Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for 
Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 647 (1981) (“[T]he First Amendment does 
not guarantee the right to communicate one’s views at all times and places or in any 
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have in the past described the principle that governs this baseline role as 
the “neutrality principle.”14  The Supreme Court’s most recent full 
articulation of this principle came in the majority’s opinion in Citizens 
United v. Federal Election Commission:
15
 
Premised on mistrust of governmental power, the First 
Amendment stands against attempts to disfavor certain subjects or 
viewpoints.
16
 Prohibited, too, are restrictions distinguishing among 
different speakers, allowing speech by some but not others.
17
  As 
instruments to censor, these categories are interrelated: Speech 
restrictions based on the identity of the speaker are all too often 
simply a means to control content.
18
  
The neutrality principle is the bedrock of all First Amendment 
protection.
19
 Governmental discrimination against speakers with 
particular viewpoints on favored topics, or against all speakers on 
disfavored topics, or against particular speakers or classes of speakers 
                                                                                                                         
manner that may be desired”); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574 (1941).  
Nevertheless, it is necessary to begin by deconstructing these limitations to reveal what 
they limit, and then to continue by reconstructing the limits, that we might better 
understand where each fits within the First Amendment superstructure.   
14
 Bauries, supra note 12, at 730.  I derived this principle from the seminal work of 
Kenneth Karst elucidating what he termed the “principle of equality.”  See generally 
Kenneth L. Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 20 (1975).   
15
 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
16
 Id. at 312 (citing United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 
(2000)). 
17
 Id. at 312-13 (citing First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784 (1978)). 
18
 Id. at 340-41; see also Darrel C. Menthe, The Marketplace Metaphor and Commercial 
Speech Doctrine: Or How I Learned to Stop Worrying About and Love Citizens United, 
38 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 131, 133 (2010) (“Citizens United radically affirmed the 
principle that the First Amendment must be neutral as between different speakers, 
holding that even corporate speech (at least on political matters) is fully protected by the 
First Amendment and cannot be subject to increased regulation merely because of its 
corporate authorship”). 
19
 See, e.g., Joseph Blocher, Viewpoint Neutrality and Government Speech, 52 B.C. L. 
REV. 695, 706 (2011); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Judicially Manageable Standards and 
Constitutional Meaning, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1274, 1304-05 (2006); Frederick Schauer, 
Towards an Institutional First Amendment, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1256, 1270 (2005); Erwin 
Chemerinsky, Content Neutrality as a Central Problem of Freedom of Speech: Problems 
in the Supreme Court’s Application, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 49, 50 (2000); Elena Kagan, 
Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First Amendment 
Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 414 (1996); see also Karst, supra note 15, at 35. 
Volume 2 Education Law & Policy Review 2015 
93 
 
regardless of topic, all presumptively violate the First Amendment.
20
 
     But in practice, a strict neutrality principle is difficult to uphold in 
every case, or even in most cases.  Under the baseline expressive right and 
the baseline responsibility of government to remain completely 
disinterested in expression, the potential problems become obvious.  The 
classic objection asks what we should do when someone shouts “Fire!” in 
a crowded theater, causing a panic and possibly injury and death.
21
  Other 
classical critiques ask what we should do about speech that falsely 
defames the reputation of another, or speech that defrauds, or speech that 
puts another in reasonable fear for his life or safety.  These questions and 
many others have caused the doctrine of the First Amendment to develop 
mostly as a set of limitations on the baseline right to speak however, 
whenever, and wherever one pleases, expressing whatever viewpoint one 
has on whatever topic one might choose to address.  Indeed, it is plausible 
to say that the baseline right is largely hypothetical, and it is the 
limitations on this hypothetical basic right that make up the entire doctrine 
of the First Amendment. 
     These doctrines of limitations in expressive rights break down under 
three analytical categories—content-based exemptions, government role 
analysis, and forum analysis.   
 
Content-based Exemptions 
 
     The simplest of these doctrines of limitation are the various content-
based categorical exemptions from First Amendment protection that the 
courts have constructed over time.
22
 Harry Kalven referred to the theory 
underlying these exemptions as the “two-level theory,” owing to the fact 
that exemptions are typically created due to a determination by the Court 
                                                 
20
 See Karst, supra note 14, at 40 (criticizing Alexander Meiklejohn’s value-based theory 
of the First Amendment and stating, “A vital public forum requires a principle of equal 
liberty of expression that is broad, protecting speakers as well as ideas”). This 
presumptive protection can be overcome, but the government must meet a very 
demanding burden to overcome it. See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, 
Permissible Tailoring and Transcending Strict Scrutiny, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2417, 2417 
n.1 (1996) (introducing the general rule that content- or viewpoint-based restrictions 
imposed on speech by the government, acting in its sovereign capacity, must overcome 
strict scrutiny). 
21
 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (opinion of Holmes, J., for the Court) 
(“The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man falsely shouting 
fire in a theater and causing a panic”).   
22
 See Bauries & Schach, supra note 10, at n.5 (collecting cases establishing the various 
low-value speech exceptions).     
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that the exempted content constitutes “low-value” speech.23 These 
exemptions today include such speech categories as “true threats,”24 
“obscenity,”25 “fighting words,”26 “incitement of imminent lawless 
activity,”27 and several others.28  
     These categories of speech content have been judicially deemed to be 
of such low value to the public discourse that they qualify for reduced, or 
even no, First Amendment protection.  Inside schools, the categories 
apply, but courts do not often find it necessary to discuss them due to the 
other standards that apply to all speech in schools, as discussed below.   
 
Government Role Analysis 
 
     Government role analysis asks what role the government occupies 
toward a speaker when it acts to suppress or punish that speaker’s speech. 
Familiar roles that the Court has recognized include government-as-
employer; government-as-patron; government-as-proprietor; and more 
recently, government-as-speaker.
29
 Each of these roles entitles the 
government’s interests to greater initial weight in an ex ante balancing of 
interests than these interests would receive in some cases if ex post 
balancing were used. 
     For example, when the government acts as a patron of the arts, which it 
does primarily through the funding of grants, it must have the power to 
discriminate between works of art or proposed works of art as to their 
quality.
30
  Arts funding is limited, and it does not serve the public interest 
to fund art projects that are of low quality or impact.  But in order to direct 
                                                 
23
 Harry Kalven, Jr., The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 10 
(1960). 
24
 E.g., Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003).   
25
 E.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S 15 (1973). 
26
 E.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).   
27
 E.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).   
28
 See Bauries & Schach, supra note 10.  
29
 See, e.g., Judith Areen, Government as Educator: A New Understanding of First 
Amendment Protection of Academic Freedom and Governance, 97 GEO. L.J. 945, 989 
(2009) (proposing a new category for government role analysis, “government-as-
educator,” based on ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, 
COMMUNITY, MANAGEMENT 199–267 (1995)); Blocher, supra note 19 (arguing that 
government speech secures a governmental right to discriminate based on viewpoint 
when it is the speaker). 
30
 See PAUL HORWITZ, FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONS 61 (2013) (describing arts 
funding as one of the “snares” inherent in an “acontextual” approach to the First 
Amendment). 
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limited public funding to projects of high value, the government must 
make a determination—one based on content—as to which of two 
competing works or proposed works is of higher quality.
31
 
     One government role that has particular significance to the issues 
discussed in this Article is the role of “government-as-employer.”32  When 
the government acts as an employer, it must maintain a certain level of 
control over its workplace, both to protect the quality of the services it 
offers to the public and to ensure that its employees do not violate the 
rights of private individuals.  When the government is an employer in 
certain of its workplaces, it inevitably employs people, such as attorneys, 
teachers, professors, and press secretaries, who “speak” for a living.  
     Pickering v. Board of Education,
33
 the leading case on public employee 
speech rights, illustrates the case-by-case approach.  In Pickering, a local 
Board of Education dismissed a teacher after he sent a letter to a 
newspaper criticizing the Board’s prior handling of proposals to increase 
the Board’s revenues.34  The Board determined that the letter was 
“detrimental to the efficient operation and administration of the schools of 
the district” and that these interests justified his dismissal.35  The Court 
held the dismissal unconstitutional, holding that, absent substantial 
justification, “a teacher’s exercise of his right to speak on issues of public 
importance may not furnish the basis for his dismissal from public 
employment.”36  The Court engaged in a balancing of the interests of the 
Board as an employer and the interests of Mr. Pickering as a participant in 
public debate.  The Court ultimately concluded that the Board could state 
no interest sufficient to overcome the interest of Mr. Pickering in 
participating as an ordinary citizen in an important public discussion.   
     In 1983, the Supreme Court modified Pickering through its decision in 
Connick v. Myers,
37
 holding that a public employee’s internal 
questionnaire, circulated among her co-employees, was unprotected 
                                                 
31
See Nat’l Endowment for Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 587-88 (1998) (“Finally, 
although the First Amendment certainly has application in the subsidy context, we note 
that the Government may allocate competitive funding according to criteria that would be 
impermissible were direct regulation of speech or a criminal penalty at stake”).  
32
 See, e.g., Areen, supra note 30, at 990-91 (describing this role). 
33
 391 U.S. 563 (1968).  For a thoughtful summary of the pre-Garcetti jurisprudence, 
beginning with Pickering, see Robert M. O’Neil, Academic Speech in the Post-Garcetti 
Environment, 7 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 1 (2008).    
34
 Pickering, 391 U.S. at 564. 
35
 Id. at 564-565 (citations omitted). 
36
 Id. at 574. 
37
 461 U.S. 138 (1983). 
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speech, due to its nature as a personal employee grievance, rather than a 
matter of public concern, and also due to its negative impact on office 
operations and efficiency.
38
  After Connick, a court facing a First 
Amendment retaliation claim is required to engage in a threshold inquiry, 
which requires the court, prior to engaging in the Pickering balancing test, 
to first ascertain whether the employee’s speech addressed a matter of 
public concern.
39
  If the answer to this question is “no,” then the speech is 
unprotected.
40
  If the answer is “yes,” then the court proceeds to the 
Pickering balancing test, but this threshold determination of public 
concern precedes the Pickering test in all cases.
41
     
     Following Pickering and Connick, the Court entertained few public 
employee First Amendment retaliation claims.  However, one significant 
pre-Connick case, Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School District,
42
 
further clarified that neither the place nor the target of the speech in 
question is dispositive when determining whether the speech is protected.  
In Givhan, the Court held that an employee’s internal complaints to her 
principal about possible race discrimination in personnel decisions at her 
school site were protected speech.
43
  Thus, the fact that speech on a matter 
of public concern is made while an employee is at work, to a superior, or 
otherwise through internal channels (rather than through a public 
medium), does not render the speech unprotected.   
     Most observers saw Connick as a tilting of the Pickering balance in 
favor of employers,
44
 but the basic protection for public employee speech 
remained.
45
  This was the state of public employee First Amendment law 
when Chief Justice Roberts took the gavel—a general protection of the 
speech of public employees on matters of public concern against 
retaliation, subject to override where employer interests outweigh the 
                                                 
38
 Id. at 150-54.  
39
 Robert C. Cloud, Public Employee Speech on Matters Pursuant to their Official 
Duties: Whistle While you Work?, 210 EDUC. L. REP. 855, 857-858 (2006).   
40
 Id. at 858. 
41
 Id. at 861. 
42
 439 U.S. 410 (1979).   
43
 Id. at 415-16.   
44
 See, e.g., Stephen Allred, From Connick to Confusion: The Struggle to Define Speech 
on Matters of Public Concern, 64 IND. L.J. 43, 47-50 (1988). 
45
 Indeed, the Court added one more significant precedent a few years after Connick, 
Rankin v. McPherson, recognizing an expansive definition of “matter of public concern.” 
See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 381, 385 (1987) (holding that a public 
employee’s expression of hope that the failed shooters of President Reagan in 1981 “get 
him” if they were to try again was speech on a matter of public concern). 
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interests of the employee in speaking and the public in receiving the 
message. 
     One of the Roberts Court’s earliest decisions, Garcetti v. Ceballos46 
was what many consider to be a radical departure from the Pickering 
regime, even as limited by Connick and Mt. Healthy.  Like Connick, 
Garcetti did not involve an academic employee.  Ceballos, the plaintiff, 
was a “calendar deputy” for the Los Angeles District Attorney’s Office.47  
Consistent with his responsibilities in this role, at the urging of defense 
counsel in a pending case, Ceballos examined a search warrant that had 
been obtained against the defense counsel’s client.48 
     Concluding that the affidavit supporting the warrant was plagued by 
misrepresentations and serious factual inaccuracies, Ceballos authored a 
memorandum to that effect and submitted it to his superiors.
49
  This 
submission led to a heated discussion, and ultimately, Ceballos’s superiors 
rejected the memorandum’s conclusions.50  Subsequently, defense counsel 
called Ceballos as a witness in the suppression hearing, and Ceballos 
testified substantially in concert with his memorandum, but the judge 
denied the motion to suppress.
51
  Finally, when all was said and done, 
Ceballos was transferred to a less desirable position.
52
 
     Ceballos filed suit claiming, among other things, retaliation for the 
exercise of his First Amendment right to speak on matters of public 
concern.
53
  When the case reached the Supreme Court, the only speech 
that was at issue was Ceballos’s written memorandum to his superiors.54  
The Court considered the memorandum in light of the Pickering line of 
cases and concluded that it was not the kind of speech that the Pickering 
line was designed to protect.  Rather than “citizen speech,” Ceballos’s 
memorandum was speech made “pursuant to [Ceballos’s] duties” as a 
calendar deputy.
55
  The Court then stated as its holding a categorical rule 
of exclusion from the First Amendment’s protection: 
 
                                                 
46
 547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
47
 Id. at 413.  
48
 Id. at 413-15. 
49
 Id. at 414.   
50
 Id.  
51
 Id. at 415.  
52
 Id. 
53
 Id. 
54
 See id. 420-26. 
55
 Id. at 415. 
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We hold that when public employees make statements 
pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not 
speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the 
Constitution does not insulate their communications from 
employer discipline.
56
  
 
     The Garcetti Court’s choice to adopt a categorical rule excluding 
certain speech from First Amendment protection has drawn fervent 
criticism. Multiple legal commentators have critiqued the decision on the 
grounds that it is unthinkingly formalistic.
57
  These critiques center upon 
the Court’s adoption of a threshold categorical rule to precede, and in 
some cases preclude, the interest balancing that would otherwise be 
conducted in cases alleging First Amendment retaliation.
58
  Commentators 
generally contend that a categorical rule is inappropriate in the context of 
the First Amendment,
59
 and that any such rule is likely to render 
                                                 
56
 Id. at 421. 
57
 See, e.g., Secunda, Right-Privilege, supra note 6, at 912; Secunda, Federal Employees, 
supra note 6, at 123 (“Consistent with Justice Stevens’ dissent in Garcetti, I reject the 
dichotomous, overly-formalistic view of a public employee as either being a citizen or 
worker, but never simultaneously both.”); Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, Public Employee 
Speech Rights Fall Prey to an Emerging Doctrinal Formalism, 15 WM. & MARY BILL 
RTS. J. 1173, 1174, 1192 (2007). 
58
 Sources cited supra note 57. 
59
 Garcetti was not the first case in which the Supreme Court set down a categorical rule 
creating an exemption from First Amendment scrutiny.  Under the current understanding 
of the First Amendment, there are several such exemptions, each of which describes a 
category of speech that does not qualify for First Amendment protection.  See, e.g., 
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003) (true threats); Miller v. California, 413 U.S 15 
(1973) (obscenity); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (fighting 
words); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (incitement to imminent lawless 
activity); N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (defamation, including a modified, 
but still categorical, exception if the subject is a public figure); see also New York v. 
Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (child pornography).  But see Ashcroft v. Free Speech 
Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002) (striking down portions of the federal statute 
criminalizing child pornography, 18 U.S.C. § 2256, as overly broad).  In addition to these 
categories, several speech-related acts have been criminalized or have formed the basis of 
tort liability in the states with little resulting First Amendment scrutiny.  See, e.g., ERWIN 
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1078-91 (4th ed. 2011) 
(discussing defamation together with privacy torts and intentional infliction of emotional 
distress).  Professor Sheldon Nahmod has pointed out that each of these categories is 
based on the content of the speech and its intrinsic value, rather than the identity of the 
speaker, and that the Garcetti exemption presents a departure from traditional First 
Amendment principles.  Sheldon H. Nahmod, Public Employee Speech, Categorical 
Balancing, and § 1983: A Critique of Garcetti v. Ceballos, 42 U. RICH. L. REV. 561, 570-
71 (2008). 
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unprotected speech that ought to be protected, considering the purposes of 
the First Amendment.
60
  This is a familiar critique of formalist rules, but 
one commentator has pointed out that the decision is likely to lead to 
results contrary even to the professed values of formalist judging—namely 
the fostering of predictability and the cabining of the influence of ideology 
in the judicial process.
61
  Indeed, many courts applying Garcetti have 
over-read the case to deny First Amendment protection of any kind to 
speech simply made during the course of a public employee’s 
employment, or speech related to a public employee’s employment.62  
These rulings have caused many to conclude that Garcetti was wrongly 
decided,
63
 and have been used as support for more general critiques of the 
formalism of the Roberts Court.
64
 
     The Pickering-Garcetti line of precedent recognizes that the 
government must be able to exercise some control over the speech of its 
employees who are hired to speak, and Garcetti held that the government 
may exercise total control where the speech is made “pursuant to official 
duties.”65  As is true in the context of categorical exemption from the First 
Amendment’s protection, this line of precedent inherently lessens, and in 
some cases completely eliminates, the government’s duty of neutrality 
toward speech and speakers.  
     Another government role that is particularly important to this Article’s 
analysis might best be described as “government as educator.”66  In its role 
as the provider of public education to the vast majority of school-age 
children in the country, the government may restrict the speech of students 
                                                 
60
See, e.g., Secunda, Federal Employees, supra note 6, at 118 (federal employee speech); 
Rhodes, supra note 57, at 1201 n. 204 (academic speech); Sheldon H. Nahmod, 
Academic Freedom and the Post-Garcetti Blues, 7 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 54, 56 (2008) 
(same); Helen Norton, Government Workers and Government Speech, 7 FIRST AMEND. L. 
REV. 75, 90 (2008) (whistleblower/government auditor speech). 
61
 Rhodes, supra note 57, at 1193. 
62
See Bauries & Schach, supra note 10 (documenting the broadening of the Garcetti 
categorical exemption in lower court decision making). 
63
Rhodes, supra note 57, at 1174; Secunda, Federal Employees, supra note 6, at 117; 
Norton, supra note 60, at 83; Nahmod, supra note 60, at 54. 
64
Secunda, Right-Privilege, supra note 6, at 911. 
65
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006). 
66
See generally Zouhary, supra note 1, at 2254-55 (explaining the speech-restrictive 
privileges the government obtains when it steps into its role as educator).  Judith Areen 
uses this term to describe a proposed reconceptualization of state governments as higher 
education providers.  Areen, supra note 29.  Here, I am using the term more broadly to 
reflect the substantial body of case law that governs student speech in public schools and 
classrooms.   
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to protect its ability to accomplish its public duty to educate.
67
 
     For example, even the political speech of students may conceivably be 
limited in schools if it causes or portends a material and substantial 
disruption of the learning environment.  This rule comes out of the 
seminal case of Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School 
District.
 68
  In Tinker, several students wore black armbands to protest the 
Vietnam War, and they were punished as a result.  Uttering those famous 
words that students do not “shed their constitutional rights to freedom of 
speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate,”69 the Supreme Court held 
that student speech may be suppressed based on its content or viewpoint 
only if such speech “materially and substantially disrupt[s] the work and 
discipline of the school.”70   
     Based on Tinker and subsequent student speech decisions, the Court 
permits school administrators to suppress speech in schools that is lewd or 
outside the bounds of decorum.
71
  The Court has even approved a school 
administration’s ability to limit student speech outside the physical limits 
of the school grounds where it was evident to the Court that the speech 
occurred at a “school sponsored function.”72  But these cases presented 
scenarios that convinced the Court that disrupting the learning 
environment was inevitable where speech conflicted with or urged the 
rejection of school rules of behavior—a debatable case surely, but one 
within the Tinker standard nonetheless.  So, in most of their interactions 
outside the classroom, students enjoy capacious, but not unlimited, First 
Amendment protections, and administrators must steer widely around any 
prohibitions on political or other speech based on its content or viewpoint 
unless they can convincingly predict a material and substantial disruption 
                                                 
67
 Zouhary, supra note 2, at 2254-55.   
68
 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). 
69
 Id. at 506.   
70
 Id. at 513-14.  The Court also mentioned “colliding with the rights of others” as a 
potential basis for suppression.  Id. at 513 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F. 2d 744, 749 
(5th
 
Cir. 1966)).  Many commentators, and some courts, have treated this concern as 
being a “second prong” of the Tinker test, justifying speech suppression even where no 
substantial disruption to learning happens or is reasonably predictable, if the speech in 
question is found to “collide with the rights of others.”  Whatever that vague phrase may 
mean, there was no plausible argument in Tinker that the rights of other students were 
being interfered with, and no Supreme Court case since has rested its approval of a 
restriction of student speech on that ground, so the sometimes-alleged “second prong” of 
Tinker was likely an aside or a way of restating the “substantial interference” rule, rather 
than a separate dimension of the Court’s test.   
71
 Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986).   
72
 See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 401-02 (2007). 
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to the school environment. 
     As to speech within the classroom or in furtherance of co-curricular 
activities such as student newspapers, a different set of rules applies.  The 
foundational case in this area, Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier, held that public 
school officials may censor student speech by removing certain items from 
student newspapers published as part of school journalism classes, 
provided that such removal or censoring is done to serve “legitimate 
pedagogical concerns.”73  The Court justified this rule based in part on 
forum analysis.  The Court reasoned that, rather than being a designated 
public forum for student expression, the school newspaper was part of the 
school’s curriculum, and therefore was a closed or nonpublic forum, in 
which speech could be subjected to restrictions reasonable in light of the 
purposes of the forum.
74
 
     Because Hazelwood was decided in the context of the censoring of a 
school newspaper, it is reasonable to ask what the case has to do with 
student speech in the non-journalism class.  However, the Court’s framing 
of its holding makes clear that it was working under the assumption that 
classroom speech could be restricted in the same way.  Drawing a 
connection between the co-curricular newspaper activity at issue in 
Hazelwood and the classroom, the Court developed its “legitimate 
pedagogical justification test” as uniquely suited to, and reasonable in 
light of, the delivery of the school’s curriculum: 
 
These activities may fairly be characterized as part of the 
school curriculum, whether or not they occur in a 
traditional classroom setting, so long as they are 
supervised by faculty members and designed to impart 
particular knowledge or skills to student participants and 
audiences.
75
 
 
So, the Court, assuming that speech made in the classroom would be part 
of the school’s curriculum, then extended the analysis to activities which 
might not occur in the classroom, but which would “carry the imprimatur 
of the school.”76  By drawing this connection, the Court made it clear that 
both the classroom and certain co-curricular activities carry with them the 
                                                 
73
 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988). 
74
 Id. at 267 (citations omitted) (quoting Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ 
Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 n.7, 47 (1983)).   
75
 Id. at 270. 
76
 Id. at 270-71.   
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“imprimatur of the school,” and that speech can therefore be restricted in 
both environments based on “legitimate pedagogical concerns.”77   
 
Forum Analysis 
 
     Some of the roles the government may assume are straightforward, 
while other roles have multiple levels of complexity.  The greatest 
complexity in the doctrine results when the government assumes the role 
of the owner or manager of property, what we might term, “government-
as-proprietor.”  In this role, the government, like any property owner or 
controller, must sometimes exercise control over who may access a certain 
piece of property and what such persons may do once on the property.  
This necessity has spawned a truly byzantine web of doctrinal rules, 
collectively placed under the label “forum analysis,” which determine the 
extent to which government may suppress or control speech or speakers 
on its own property, or on property within its control. 
     The basic distinctions break down into four categories of forums: the 
traditional public forum, the designated public forum, the limited public 
forum, and the closed or non-public forum.  A traditional public forum is a 
government-owned space, such as a public park, a beach, or a sidewalk, 
which has traditionally been “held in trust for the public”78 and has been 
freely used by speakers to proclaim things to the public.
79
  In such a 
forum, no content or viewpoint discrimination is allowed unless the 
                                                 
77
See Waldman, supra note 4 (outlining the application of Hazelwood to student speech 
in the classroom).  Incidentally, Prof. Waldman’s article does an excellent job of 
disentangling what was then a confusing web of applications of Hazelwood to all sorts of 
speech, including the speech of teachers.  As this Article demonstrates, Garcetti likely 
subsumes any prior caselaw applying Hazelwood to teacher speech, so Prof. Waldman 
was quite prescient in arguing for a return to Hazelwood as purely a student speech case, 
as it is treated here.  See Waldman, supra note 3. 
78
See, e.g., Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939) (“Wherever 
the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the 
use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, 
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.  Such use of 
the streets and public places has, from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, 
immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens.  The privilege of a citizen of the United 
States to use the streets and parks for communication of views on national questions may 
be regulated in the interest of all; it is not absolute, but relative, and must be exercised in 
subordination to the general comfort and convenience, and in consonance with peace and 
good order; but it must not, in the guise of regulation, be abridged or denied”). 
79
See Lyrissa Lidsky, Public Forum 2.0, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1975, 1981 (2011) (explaining 
the various forum categories that govern forum analysis, and the conceptual problems 
with each). 
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government can defend such a restriction as necessary to achieve a 
compelling government interest, but the government may adopt reasonable 
“time, place, and manner” restrictions, so long as such restrictions are 
reasonable in light of the expressive interests of speakers and listeners.
80
 
     For a piece of government property to be a traditional public forum, it 
must have been used by the public historically for the purpose of speech.
81
 
For all other government property, the government has the baseline right 
of exclusion that all property owners have.  But the government can also 
designate a piece of its property that has not traditionally been used for 
speech as being open for that use.  This latter type of forum is called a 
“designated” or “open” forum, and it places the same restrictions on 
government as the traditional public forum as to the regulation of speech 
by its content or viewpoint.
82
   
     The other two categories grant the government more power to restrict 
speech, and these categories are the most relevant to the topic of 
classroom speech.  Just as the government may designate a piece of its 
property to be open to speech, it may also designate that property to be 
open only for a particular category of speech topics or a particular class of 
speakers.  If so, then the forum is termed a “limited public forum.”83  A 
school board meeting, for example, might be designated a limited public 
forum for discussion of property tax rates, or a publicly owned auditorium 
might be designated a limited public forum for the presentation of 
candidate debates for an upcoming election.  Lyrissa Lidsky offers a 
succinct explanation of the general rules that apply in this type of forum: 
 
When the State decides to open a public forum but limits it 
to certain speakers and topics, the State’s establishment of 
forum parameters is constitutional, so long as the 
parameters are reasonable and viewpoint neutral.  When the 
State applies the forum criteria and excludes a speaker 
based on the subject matter of his speech, the exclusion 
need only be “reasonable in light of the purposes served by 
                                                 
80
 Id. at 1982.  Of course, as with many rights-based limitations on government power, 
the government can surmount the prohibition on its regulation of speech in a public 
forum even based on content by satisfying the demanding “strict scrutiny” test, which 
requires that the government establish a compelling government interest in regulating the 
speech and that the regulation in question is narrowly tailored to the government’s 
interest.  Id. 
81
 Id. 
82
 Id. at 1984. 
83
 Id. at 1984-85. 
Volume 2 Education Law & Policy Review 2015 
104 
 
the forum” and viewpoint neutral, though there is some 
indication that the Court may be especially stringent in 
examining viewpoint neutrality if religious viewpoints are 
involved. Finally, when a State opens a public forum but 
excludes a speaker whose speech obviously falls within the 
subject matter constraints of the forum, the exclusion is 
subject to strict scrutiny.
84
 
 
     Finally, a closed or non-public forum is a similar piece of property that 
the government has not opened up to the public for debate on any topic.  
In such a forum, the government-as-property-owner’s power to select and 
exclude speakers is paramount, and the government may exclude most 
speakers and even most potential listeners, as long as such exclusions are 
reasonable in light of the purpose of the forum, and as long as it does not 
exclude them on the grounds that it disfavors their viewpoints.
85
  The 
leading case recognizing such a closed forum is Perry Education 
Association v. Perry Local Educators’ Association, in which the Court 
held the faculty mail system to be closed to a rival teacher’s union, even 
though it was opened to communications from the then-current bargaining 
representative.
86
  
     Intuitively, the classroom most appropriately fits within the concept of 
the closed or nonpublic forum, because it is well accepted that the 
government need not permit any speakers within the classroom other than 
the students, teachers, and school personnel who generally occupy it.
87
  
But, as to both teachers and students as speakers, the classroom manifestly 
does not follow the rules of that forum.
88
  To understand why, we must 
examine the different doctrinal limitations that apply in the classroom to 
teachers and students as speakers.   
 
                                                 
84
 Id. at 1988-89 (internal citations omitted). 
85
 Id. at 1989. 
86
 Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983). 
87
 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 267 (1988) (comparing the student 
newspaper at issue in that case with the classroom and justifying content and viewpoint 
restrictions based on “legitimate pedagogical concerns” in both).  
88
 Contrariwise, the overall school environment (hallways, athletic fields, etc.) outside of 
class and co-curricular activities operates more like a limited public forum, limited to 
certain participants, but not to certain topics of conversation or viewpoints.  See Tinker v. 
Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
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The Teacher as a First Amendment Speaker  
 
     Teachers and administrators are simultaneously: 1) Employees, who 
often must speak to fulfill their contractual employment duties; (2) 
Citizens, who may speak responsibly on matters of public concern;
89
 and 
3) Embodiments of “the State,” which the Constitution disables from 
acting to limit the rights of the other participants in the marketplace of 
ideas.
90
  Like all public employees, public school teachers maintain their 
basic constitutional rights despite their status as government employees.  
Under the “unconstitutional conditions” doctrine, a public entity may not 
condition the provision of a public benefit—including public 
employment—on one’s relinquishment of a constitutional right.91   
     Nevertheless, courts have permitted the government, acting in its role 
as employer, to limit public educational employees’ speech that would 
otherwise be protected in a non-employment setting.
92
  In most cases, 
these limitations have sought to protect interests similar to those served by 
limits on student speech, often centering on concerns of pedagogical 
effectiveness and school managerial interests.
93
  Until recently, such 
limitations have largely emerged through case-by-case analysis, rather 
than through categorical rules.  However, the Court’s recent decision in 
Garcetti, discussed above, introduced the categorical rule completely 
excluding job-required speech from the First Amendment’s protections, 
                                                 
89
 See generally NELDA H. CAMBRON-MCCABE, MARTHA M. MCCARTHY, & STEPHEN B. 
THOMAS, LEGAL RIGHTS OF TEACHERS AND STUDENTS 228-39 (2d ed. 2009) (discussing 
teacher rights to free expression).   
90
 See id. at 93 (discussing the “state action” doctrine in schools).   
91
 See, e.g., Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967) (holding that a public 
university cannot condition employment as a professor on the professor’s signing of a 
“Loyalty Oath”); Kathleen A. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 
1413, 1415 (1989) (outlining the state of the “unconstitutional conditions” doctrine).  But 
see Secunda, Right-Privilege, supra note 6, at 912 (arguing that the Supreme Court’s line 
of decisions in Pickering, Connick, and Garcetti have weakened the unconstitutional 
conditions doctrine to the point of near obliteration).     
92
 See Williams v. Dallas Ind. Sch. Dist., 480 F.3d 689, 690-691 (5th Cir. 2007); Mayer 
v. Monroe Cnty. Cmty. Sch. Co., 474 F.3d 477 (7th Cir. 2007); Brammer-Hoelter v. 
Twin Peaks Charter Acad., 492 F.3d 1192 (5th Cir. 2007). 
93
 See, e.g., Boring v. Buncombe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 364, 370 (4th Cir. 1998) 
(“We agree with Plato and Burke and Justice Frankfurter that the school, not the teacher, 
has the right to fix the curriculum”); see also Lawrence Rosenthal, The Emerging First 
Amendment Law of Managerial Prerogative, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 33 (2008) (arguing 
that Garcetti is the latest in a series of Supreme Court decisions elevating “managerial 
prerogative” to constitutional status).   
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regardless of its content or viewpoint.
94
 
     Read on its own literal terms, the Garcetti rule would plainly bring 
within its ambit all of the pedagogical and scholarly academic speech of 
public school teachers.  Speaking of the analogous case of public 
university professors, Justice Souter pointed out in his dissent: 
 
This ostensible domain beyond the pale of the First 
Amendment is spacious enough to include even the 
teaching of a public university professor, and I have to 
hope that today’s majority does not mean to imperil First 
Amendment protection of academic freedom in public 
colleges and universities, whose teachers necessarily speak 
and write “pursuant to . . . official duties.”95 
 
In response to Justice Souter’s concerns about the teaching and 
scholarship of higher education academics, Justice Kennedy hedged: 
 
There is some argument that expression related to academic 
scholarship or classroom instruction implicates additional 
constitutional interests that are not fully accounted for by 
this Court’s customary employee-speech jurisprudence.  
We need not, and for that reason do not, decide whether the 
analysis we conduct today would apply in the same manner 
to a case involving speech related to scholarship or 
teaching.
96
 
 
Nevertheless, whatever Justice Kennedy meant in response to Justice 
Souter’s concern, it is clear that the terms of the Garcetti exclusion apply 
squarely to the expression of public school teachers in the classroom.  
Teachers in the classroom, at least while delivering curricular content, 
managing student behavior, and responding to questions about the 
material, always speak “pursuant to their official duties.”   
     The Garcetti rule, recall, does not contain any exception for the 
suppression or punishment of speech based on its content or even its 
viewpoint.  If it is speech made pursuant to an official duty to speak, it is 
categorically unprotected.  This means that the classroom, at least for 
teachers, lacks the protections of even a closed or nonpublic forum (the 
                                                 
94
 See supra notes 46-65 (discussing Garcetti).   
95
 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 438 (2006) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
96
 Id. at 425. 
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forum category it is typically assumed to occupy) because even a closed or 
nonpublic forum requires that excluding or silencing a speaker due to 
disagreement with his viewpoint be justified by strict scrutiny.
97
  In fact, 
teacher speech in the classroom occupies a status equivalent to “low-
value” speech, such as speech inciting a riot, or child pornography, which 
also receive no protection, regardless of viewpoint.
98
  Based on this 
reading, then, it would seem that, rather than a closed or nonpublic forum, 
the classroom is a zone of no protection when it comes to teacher speech.
99
   
     As an illustration, in Mayer v. Monroe County Community School 
Corporation,
100
  the Seventh Circuit heard the case of a probationary 
elementary school teacher whose contract was not renewed after she 
answered a question from a student in her class.  In a current events 
lesson, Mayer was discussing political protests.  In response to a student’s 
question whether Mayer had personally participated in a political 
demonstration, Mayer said that she did honk her car horn when passing a 
placard that read “Honk for Peace” during the second Iraq War.101   
     After the school district declined to renew her contract, Mayer sued for 
retaliation, citing this in-class expression as the basis.  During the course 
of the suit, Mayer stipulated that speaking on current events was one of 
her official duties, and she rested her hopes entirely on the principles of 
academic freedom in seeking the First Amendment’s protection.102  This 
stipulation made the Seventh Circuit’s decision on the threshold question 
easy—if speaking to her students on the topic of current events was one of 
her official duties, then her statements made during the current events 
lesson in question constituted speech “pursuant to” such duties.103  
However, Mayer contended that the Garcetti rule does not control 
                                                 
97
 See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 19, at 57.   
98
 See Bauries & Schach, supra note 10, at 358, n.5.   
99
 Professor Alan Brownstein proposes and defends the new concept of the “nonforum” 
as the category that should govern speech in schools and at school-sponsored functions.  
See Brownstein, supra note 1.  This proposed new forum category, which immunizes 
speech from any judicial review, governs student, rather than teacher, speech, but it is 
analogous to the complete lack of protection for teacher classroom speech under current 
doctrine.   
100
 474 F.3d 477 (7th Cir. 2007). 
101
 Mayer, 474 F.3d 478. 
102
 Id. at 479.  Based on the Seventh Circuit’s traditional approach to the topic and the 
lack of helpful precedent from the Supreme Court, see generally Bauries, supra note 12, 
Ms. Mayer’s legal strategy to rely on academic freedom was likely a mistake, and a better 
approach would have been to contest the compulsory nature of her current events lesson.   
103
 Id. at 480. 
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classroom speech.
104
   
     The court rejected this contention.  The Seventh Circuit has historically 
held that classroom teachers do not have the freedom to choose 
instructional materials or deliver instruction in ways conflicting with the 
wishes of their supervisors.
105
  Building from this existing rule, the court 
explained that “the school system does not ‘regulate’ teachers’ speech as 
much as it hires that speech.”106  The court described a teacher’s 
classroom speech as a “commodity” that the teacher “sells” to the school 
district, and explained that, as such, a teacher of history may not contradict 
his district’s wishes by engaging in revisionist instruction, and a teacher of 
math may not elect on her own to teach calculus instead of 
trigonometry.
107
  The court also pointed out that, unlike in most employee 
speech cases, K-12 teachers address their speech to a captive audience, a 
fact which necessitates that curricular and pedagogical decisional authority 
rest with those who may be voted out of office for poor decisions.
108
  
     Similarly, in Evans-Marshall v. Board of Education,
109
 the Sixth 
Circuit considered the claim of a high school English teacher who had 
experienced negative reactions—first from the community, then from the 
Board of Education, and finally from her principal—regarding her book 
choices and the pedagogical strategies that she used in relation to the 
books.
110
  Ultimately, the Board voted unanimously not to renew the 
teacher’s contract, and the teacher sued, alleging unconstitutional 
interference with and retaliation for her exercise of an alleged right “to 
select books and methods of instruction for use in the classroom without 
interference from public officials.”111  When the case reached the Sixth 
Circuit, the court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that Garcetti should not 
                                                 
104
 Id. at 479. 
105
 See id. (citing Webster v. New Lenox Sch. Dist. No. 122, 917 F.2d 1004 (7th Cir. 
1990) (holding that a classroom teacher did not possess a right to teach his students that 
the Earth was thousands, rather than billions, of years old).   
106
 Id. (emphasis in original). 
107
 Id. (“A teacher hired to lead a social-studies class can't use it as a platform for a 
revisionist perspective that Benedict Arnold wasn't really a traitor, when the approved 
program calls him one; a high-school teacher hired to explicate Moby-Dick in a literature 
class can't use Cry, The Beloved Country instead, even if Paton's book better suits the 
instructor's style and point of view; a math teacher can't decide that calculus is more 
important than trigonometry and decide to let Hipparchus and Ptolemy slide in favor of 
Newton and Leibniz”).   
108
 Id. at 479-80. 
109
 428 F.3d 223 (6th Cir. 2010).   
110
 Id. at 223-26. 
111
 Id. at 223. 
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be held applicable because of the Supreme Court’s failure to squarely 
address the issue.
112
  The court acknowledged that the exchange between 
Justice Kennedy and Justice Souter in the Garcetti opinion left open the 
application of the Garcetti rule to certain academic speech, but that K-12 
classroom teaching is not among this speech.
113
  The court ultimately held 
that classroom teaching and expressive pedagogical choices, as speech 
made “pursuant to official duties,” are unprotected under the First 
Amendment.
114
   
 
The Student as a First Amendment Speaker   
 
     Students are certainly citizens with speech rights, but they are also 
public charges, such that their speech rights may be limited for their own 
protection, as well as for the protection of other students engaged in the 
educational process alongside them.
115
  It is a familiar axiom that students 
do not completely “shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or 
expression at the schoolhouse gate.”116  Nevertheless, as discussed above, 
First Amendment doctrine holds that student speech in public educational 
settings does not demand the same constitutional protections that similar 
speech made in open public forums would require.
117
   
     As discussed above, it is most plausible that, due to the Court’s 
categorical determination that curricular activities, including activities in 
the classroom, are part of a closed or nonpublic forum, Hazelwood, rather 
                                                 
112
 Id. at 233-34. 
113
 Id.  
114
 Id. at 230. 
115
 See, e.g., Scott v. Sch. Bd. of Alachua Cnty., 324 F.3d 1246, 1247 (11th Cir. 2003) 
(“Although public school students’ First Amendment rights are not forfeited at the school 
door, those rights should not interfere with a school administrator's professional 
observation that certain expressions have led to, and therefore could lead to, an unhealthy 
and potentially unsafe learning environment for the children they serve”); CAMBRON-
MCCABE, MCCARTHY, & THOMAS, supra note 89, at 94-107  (discussing student rights to 
free expression).  Prof. Brownstein calls into question this “reduced rights” paradigm, 
and he is correct as he frames the comparison—which is one between adult speech in 
closed forums and student speech outside the classroom in school or at school-sponsored 
functions.  See Brownstein, supra note 1, at 729-42.  But in the classroom, where the 
speech of students can clearly be restricted based on its viewpoint even absent a 
“compelling government interest” and “narrowly tailored means,” students certainly have 
less expansive rights than adults do in any forum they might occupy, even a closed 
forum.   
116
 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). 
117
 Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986); Morse v. Frederick, 
551 U.S. 393, 396-397 (2007).   
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than Tinker, governs student expression in the classroom.  Within this 
paradigm, since the Hazelwood case was decided, commentators have 
puzzled over whether the Court intended to approve viewpoint 
discrimination by schools and school officials in curricular settings.  A 
close reading of the decision, including the way the majority chose to 
frame its holding, as well as the evidence at issue in the case, make the 
contrary case difficult to support.
118
   
     Based on the facts before the Court, the way in which the Court 
developed its holding, and the most natural implications of the ruling, it is 
clear that the Hazelwood rule allows for viewpoint discrimination.  Most 
basically, this rule construed this way simply makes sense.  A teacher 
cannot be compelled to allow a student, during an open class discussion of 
World War II, to deliver a Holocaust denial diatribe, for example, even 
though telling him to sit down and shut up would qualify as classic 
viewpoint discrimination.
119
  If the Hazelwood rule would not permit that 
sort of censorship, then what rule would?  The student in this hypothetical 
is participating in an open class discussion, so his expression of his 
viewpoint cannot be said to be materially and substantially disruptive of 
the learning environment, in the Tinker sense.  Indeed, his contribution, 
though disturbing and manifestly incorrect, is on point, providing the 
teacher with one of those “teachable moments” that engage the dialectical 
classroom process.  He also offers his own unvarnished opinion, so his 
expression cannot be plausibly characterized as “government speech.”120  
The Hazelwood rule is all that remains that might allow for the teacher to 
simply tell the student he is not permitted to express such an opinion on 
this point—an action that is perfectly defensible, and may be quite 
                                                 
118
 See Zouhary, supra note 1, at 2252-53 (outlining several reasons, including the text of 
the Court’s holding, that Hazelwood authorized viewpoint discrimination); R. George 
Wright, School-Sponsored Speech and the Surprising Case for Viewpoint-Based 
Regulations, 31 S. ILL. U. L.J. 175, 186 (2007) (concluding that Hazelwood’s language 
compels this conclusion); Samuel P. Jordan, Viewpoint Restrictions and School-
Sponsored Student Speech: Avenues for Heightened Protection, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1555, 
1556 (2003) (“If a constitutional exception permitting restrictions on student points of 
view is not compelled by Hazelwood, it is at least arguably consistent with a fair reading 
of the decision”).   
119
 See Waldman, supra note 3, at 66 (“The real question is not whether Hazelwood 
permits viewpoint discrimination, but when”) (emphasis in original); see also Cornelius 
v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985) (holding that 
governmental restrictions on speech and speakers in even closed forums must be 
“viewpoint-neutral”). 
120
 Brownstein, supra note 1, at 751.  When expression is considered to be the 
government’s own expression, the general prohibition against content and viewpoint 
discrimination does not apply.  See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991).   
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necessary, from a pedagogical standpoint to prevent the other students 
from becoming sympathetic to an idea that has no empirical or historical 
support, or at least to teach students to distinguish between historical facts 
and unfounded conspiracy theories.     
     Other than this common sense reading, vital elements of Hazelwood 
itself indicate that the Court knew it was approving a rule that would allow 
for viewpoint discrimination for pedagogical reasons.  For example, the 
viewpoint discrimination question came up frequently at oral argument.
121
  
Justice Scalia engaged in a lengthy interrogation of the plaintiffs’ counsel 
as to how a school might be able to maintain a newspaper at all with any 
editorial discretion if viewpoint discrimination were prohibited.
122
  The 
dissent also focused on it as a stated concern.
123
  That the majority opinion 
did not specifically approve viewpoint discrimination may have been a 
matter of cobbling together a majority.
124
 
     Nevertheless, Justice White’s illustrative list of the speech a school 
could legitimately suppress under the Court’s rule ought to have laid to 
rest any doubts about viewpoint discrimination in the classroom:   
 
Hence, a school may in its capacity as publisher of a school 
newspaper or producer of a school play disassociate itself, 
not only from speech that would “substantially interfere 
with its work or impinge upon the rights of other students,” 
but also from speech that is, for example, ungrammatical, 
poorly written, inadequately researched, biased or 
prejudiced, vulgar or profane, or unsuitable for immature 
audiences. . . . In addition, a school must be able to take 
into account the emotional maturity of the intended 
audience in determining whether to disseminate student 
speech on potentially sensitive topics, which might range 
from the existence of Santa Claus in an elementary school 
setting to the particulars of teenage sexual activity in a high 
school setting.  A school must also retain the authority to 
refuse to sponsor student speech that might reasonably be 
perceived to advocate drug or alcohol use, irresponsible 
sex, or conduct otherwise inconsistent with the shared 
                                                 
121
 Zouhary, supra note 1, at 2242-44.   
122
 Id. at 2243 (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument at 21, Hazelwood School Dist. v. 
Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988) (statement of Scalia, J.)).   
123
 Id. at 2241-43.   
124
 Id. at 2244.   
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values of a civilized social order, or to associate the school 
with any position other than neutrality on matters of 
political controversy.
125
 
 
Several of these items clearly involve the school selecting between 
differing viewpoints, and most of them plausibly could involve such 
choosing under the right circumstances.   
     The classroom speech cases decided since Hazelwood, most of which 
involve student religious speech, also bear out this interpretation.  For 
example, in Peck v. Baldwinsville Central School District, students were 
given an assignment to create a poster illustrating ways in which the 
environment could be protected.  One student chose to include prayer as 
one of these ways, and her poster contained a picture of Jesus Christ.  The 
school chose to display her poster, but to obscure the picture of Jesus.  The 
Second Circuit held that the school had a “legitimate pedagogical interest” 
in preventing the impression that the school was sponsoring religion, and 
upheld the censorship.
126
   
     Similarly, in C.H. v. Oliva,
127
 the Third Circuit held that it was 
permissible for a school to censor a student’s religious viewpoints 
expressed in two school assignments.  One was a poster assignment asking 
students to represent things they were thankful for (the student listed 
“Jesus” among those things), and the other was a class reading assignment 
to bring in a story from home to read to the other students (the student 
brought in the story of Jacob and Esau from the Old Testament).  In both 
cases, the school was permitted to remove the student’s references to 
religious content and expressions of his religious viewpoint from the view 
and hearing of the other students.   
     But, if viewpoint discrimination as to classroom and other curricular 
speech is indeed permitted under Hazelwood, then we should consider 
whether the Hazelwood rule should be the final word, or whether the 
apparent confusion about viewpoint discrimination has prevented us from 
developing rules of application for Hazelwood that would value First 
Amendment interests more, while protecting school interests as they 
require.  The commentators and courts rejecting the reading of Hazelwood 
outlined above do so mainly because they are concerned about the 
marketplace of ideas, both as a valuable thing in and of itself and as a 
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 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271-72.     
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 Peck v. Baldwinsville Cent. Sch. Dist., 426 F.3d 617, 621–23, 633 (2d Cir. 2005).   
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 C.H. ex rel. Z.H. v. Oliva, 195 F.3d 167 (3d Cir. 1999), aff’d on other grounds, 226 
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teaching model for students learning to be democratic citizens.
128
  The 
traditional prescription for speech that expresses an indefensible viewpoint 
encourages “more speech.”129  In this view, carving out classroom and 
curricular speech as a unique category of speech that does not benefit from 
the prohibition against viewpoint discrimination is unwise and counter to 
the general principles of the First Amendment.
130
   
     However, the First Amendment is riddled with categories of speech 
that receive no protection, even from viewpoint discrimination.  Low-
value speech,
131
 the job-required speech of public employees,
132
 and 
government speech
133
 are all categories of speech that do not observe the 
rule against viewpoint discrimination.  Even pure political speech 
expressed in a traditional public forum can be suppressed based on its 
viewpoint if the government can meet the strict scrutiny standard.
134
  So, 
while the presumptive prohibition against viewpoint discrimination is real, 
it is by no means an immutable command of the First Amendment, and the 
failure to observe it in the classroom, and in school activities that mimic 
the classroom, is both defensible under Hazelwood and Garcetti and 
pedagogically inevitable in large-scale public schooling environments.   
 
The Limits of the Current Doctrine 
 
     The real question, then, is whether Hazelwood should be the entirety of 
speech doctrine for students in the classroom, and whether Garcetti should 
be the entirety of speech doctrine for teachers in the classroom.  While 
Hazelwood itself seems to refute the proponents of a strong prohibition 
against viewpoint discrimination in the classroom, they are certainly 
correct that students being educated in a democratic society should be able 
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 See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 288 (1988). (Brennan, J., 
dissenting).   
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 See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2550 (2012) (quoting Whitney v. 
California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)). 
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 See supra notes 46-65 and accompanying text (discussing public employee speech 
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to benefit from acting in a democratic fashion, part of which involves 
offering and defending opinions and debating ideas.  Hazelwood shows us 
that schools have a legitimate interest in taking some ideas and some 
matters of debate off the table, but that does not mean that schools and 
school officials have been given license to act without any responsibility.  
Similar to the speech of teachers, the speech of students in the classroom 
and in co-curricular activities does require some breathing space, even 
acknowledging the strong interests of schools in saying which “ideas” are 
“false.”135   
     Below, I outline a slight alteration to the doctrines of classroom speech, 
which is justified (as are the restrictive protections that prevail in schools) 
by the unique culturally inculcative and custodial conditions of the school 
environment, but which balances both control and freedom in a way 
superior to current doctrine.  The rule I propose works within the 
categorical structure of current First Amendment doctrine, but without 
creating any new or unwieldy categories.  It also works within a 
reasonable interpretation of the two prevailing cases that currently govern 
speech in the classroom, Garcetti and Hazelwood, as well as their 
classroom speech progeny, so implementing it does not require any action 
from the Supreme Court to overrule those cases.  We might describe the 
proposed rule as a rule of “benign prior restraint.”   
  
Developing a Workable Classroom Speech Doctrine 
 
Living Within the Categorical Approach  
 
     The First Amendment’s basic right (a general speech right which can 
be limited only based on a justification that would pass strict scrutiny) is 
decidedly standard-based, but each of the exceptions and augmentations to 
it introduces some element of categorical analysis.  As others have pointed 
out, this tendency to think of speech as a set of categories negatively 
impacts the marketplace of ideas.
136
  Nevertheless, we are far along that 
road now, and it makes the most sense at this point to attempt to derive 
doctrine that can work within the categorical approach, at least until the 
next shift occurs in the Court’s thinking.   
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 Cf. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974) (“Under the First 
Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea.  However pernicious an opinion may 
seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the 
competition of other ideas”).     
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     Accordingly, a successful approach to classroom speech must work 
within the categorical approach.  Below, I outline a small modification to 
the doctrines surrounding the classroom speech of both teachers and 
students.  This modification might be termed a rule of “benign prior 
restraint.”  I propose to make the standard of protection depend on 
whether the school or school official’s action in regulating such speech 
takes the form of a prior restraint or a purely post-speech punishment.  
This rule can be derived from the language of Garcetti, Hazelwood, and 
their progeny, and it comports well with the need to categorically balance 
the legitimate interests of schools and school officials in enforcing a 
certain curricular orthodoxy with the legitimate interests of both teachers 
and students as members of a democratic society, while also preventing 
undue restraint on the expressive interests of teachers and students as 
individual speakers. 
 
A Benign Prior Restraint Rule for Classroom Speech    
 
     Many scholars and courts have attempted, both before and since 
Garcetti and Hazelwood, to find a way to construct the doctrine of the 
First Amendment to allow legitimate debate and commentary in 
classrooms, where, after all, teachers should be modeling what it means to 
be a participant in a democratic republic; while also leaving copious space 
for the legitimate regulation of classroom content by those we have—by 
vote or delegation—placed in charge of the administration of our schools 
and their curriculum.  In the next section, I review two representative 
efforts before moving on to my own proposal, which draws substantially 
from these accounts.    
 
Benign Prior Restraint and the Classroom Speech of Teachers. 
 
     In recent years, numerous commentators have attempted to flesh out a 
workable doctrine of public school teacher speech protection.
137
  Of these, 
two accounts in particular stand out as well-argued and defensible under 
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current standards—one authored prior to the Court’s decision in Garcetti 
and the other authored a few years after it.  Like the rule proposed in this 
article, both of these accounts propose that we make speech protections for 
teachers depend in part on concepts of prior notice.   
     Beginning with the former, Professor Kevin Welner, perhaps predicting 
the eventual development of a Garcetti-type rule in the Supreme Court, 
advanced the claim in 2003 that the punishment of teacher speech made in 
the classroom should depend on elements of notice.
138
  Because Welner’s 
paper was authored pre-Garcetti, it is understandable that, in the main, it 
states an alternative to the “superficial” applications of Hazelwood to 
teacher classroom speech offered by some courts at that time.
139
  
Accordingly, even on its own terms, it requires some reconsideration and 
augmentation in light of the much more stringent Garcetti complete 
exclusion of the job-required speech of teachers from the protection of the 
First Amendment.   
     Welner’s approach to notice takes as its main unit of analysis the 
teacher seeking to make methodological or pedagogical decisions—
decisions as to how to deliver course content.  The Hazelwood progeny 
cases that Welner critiques fail to protect these teachers’ discretion 
because that discretion is nearly always overridden by the discretion of the 
school administrators in establishing the curriculum of the school.  
Welner’s idea is that the teacher’s discretion should be overridden in this 
way only if the school is the type that explicitly treats its teachers as 
“ministerial” employees who are not empowered to exercise pedagogical 
discretion.
140
  Absent such a policy, Welner argues, teachers should have 
the presumptive right to exercise their professional discretion in how they 
deliver their lessons.   
     There is an obvious appeal to Welner’s proposed approach.  A 
presumption that teachers are imbued with pedagogical discretion, 
rebutted only though a pre-communicated policy to the contrary, would be 
a useful rule.  But today, it would seem that Garcetti would stand in the 
way of such a presumption, at least as applied to the selection of curricular 
materials and the delivery of the actual lesson.  It is hard to imagine that 
teachers have any First Amendment claim to discretion over these matters 
after Garcetti.  As the Sixth Circuit stated in reluctantly applying Garcetti 
                                                 
138
 Kevin G. Welner, Locking up the Marketplace of Ideas and Locking out School 
Reform: Courts’ Imprudent Treatment of Controversial Teaching in America’s Public 
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to the book selection decisions of a high school English teacher:  
 
As with any other individual in the community, [the 
teacher] had no more free-speech right to dictate the 
school’s curriculum than she had to obtain a platform—a 
teaching position—in the first instance for communicating 
her preferred list of books and teaching methods. ‘[N]o 
relevant analogue’ exists between her in-class curricular 
speech and speech by private citizens.
141
   
 
This is true, the court said, “even if it otherwise appears (at least on 
summary judgment) that the school administrators treated her shabbily.”142   
     However, even under this post-Garcetti framework, it is not inevitable 
that a teacher cannot ever be a First Amendment speaker in the classroom, 
for example, when she speaks in ways that do not constitute delivering an 
actual lesson or selecting curricular materials.  And even under Garcetti, 
the court is required to engage in a searching review of what the 
employee’s “official duties” actually were, remaining skeptical of overly 
broad job descriptions and policy manuals.  Accordingly, some room 
remains for a notice-based approach to the application of Garcetti that 
draws from Welner’s prescient work.   
     In a well-argued, post-Garcetti student note, Kimberly Gee develops a 
proposed rule that depends on prior notice, as well.  Despite her note 
having been authored post-Garcetti, however, Gee’s proposal also works 
entirely within the Hazelwood teacher speech paradigm.  Gee proposes, as 
part of what she terms a “modified Hazelwood test,” that we allow the 
application of the Hazelwood “legitimate pedagogical interest” test to 
govern teacher speech only where the school or district has predetermined 
that the classroom is a “closed forum.”143  And even in such 
circumstances, “teachers should not be disciplined for violating 
regulations, even if they are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical 
concerns, when the schools fail to put them on notice that such regulations 
exist and apply to the conduct at hand.”144  Gee’s proposal has significant 
merit, as it balances the liberty interests of teachers with the power 
interests of government educational authorities and attempts to find a way 
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to allow both interests to operate within their legitimate space.  However, 
a few problems exist that counsel a different approach.   
     First, Gee gives somewhat short shrift to the importance of Garcetti to 
the classroom speech rights of teachers.  Based on the reticence of the 
federal courts in applying Pickering’s “matter of public concern” prong to 
classroom speech, along with the Seventh Circuit’s then-recent decision in 
Mayer applying Garcetti to classroom speech, Gee concludes that a 
Hazelwood-based approach, rather than Garcetti, would govern any First 
Amendment question in the classroom, at least where the district or school 
treats the classroom as a closed forum.
145
   
     But this conclusion elides the clear rule stated in Garcetti that public 
employees cannot claim First Amendment protection for any speech they 
utter “pursuant to official duties.”146  Although dicta in the Garcetti 
decision disclaims any intent on the Court’s part to address the rule’s 
application to academic speech,
147
 the Garcetti rule nevertheless squarely 
applies to classroom speech on its own terms.  A teacher’s classroom 
speech is certainly speech made “pursuant to official duties.”  No 
persuasive case has yet been made that teachers are not speaking 
“pursuant to official duties” when they teach, so any distinguishing of 
Garcetti in the context of the classroom must rely on some sort of special 
constitutional status that teachers hold.  Although there exists some 
common perception that this is so, the Supreme Court has never so held, 
and it is not likely to so hold in the future.
148
   
     Gee makes an admirable effort to identify a special constitutional status 
for teachers that would counsel against applying Pickering (and by 
extension, Garcetti) to classroom speech, arguing:  
 
Pickering’s division of speech into public and private 
realms makes sense for general government employees, 
given the authority of the state, as an employer, to ensure 
the efficiency of services provided through its employees.  
However, teachers are unlike other state employees in that 
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their employment as educators is always a matter of public 
concern.  Other government employees are not asked to 
teach lessons that are sufficiently creative to hold students’ 
attention while adhering to state mandated educational 
guidelines, to foster an environment where students are 
excited about learning, or to introduce students to a world 
of diverse people, customs, values, and ideas.  The 
Pickering test has not been tailored to address the particular 
necessities of teaching.  The classroom truly is a sui generis 
environment, and courts that apply Pickering to in-class 
teacher speech cases effectively ignore teachers’ unique 
role in society, to the disservice of everyone with an 
interest in the public school system.
149
 
 
But are these distinctions really of much constitutional significance?  And 
are they even real distinctions?  First, is the employment of any other class 
of public employees not a “matter of public concern”?  We constantly 
debate efficiency and effectiveness in government, and that debate impacts 
the employment of every person whose livelihood depends on public 
funding and public needs.  That teachers are among the more sympathetic 
public employees, and among the more familiar to the average citizen, 
does not necessarily make their jobs any more a matter of public concern 
than, say, the typical firefighter or police officer.     
     Second, it is not clear why the specific job duties of teachers should 
counsel for a different approach or a special set of rights under the First 
Amendment, as compared with the duties of other public employees.  Gee 
argues that teaching is expressive and creative work, and that the 
expression in question is governed by publicly derived goals, limits, and 
expectations, as well as by the discretion of the teacher, but so are 
lawyering, auditing, speech writing, and leading tour groups in our 
national parks, all of which are done by public employees, and all of 
which involve some discretion on the part of the employee in framing the 
expression.  Right or wrong, the Garcetti rule says that, when a public 
employee speaks pursuant to an official duty, it makes no difference 
whether the employee’s speech resulted from reasonable expressive 
choices—only whether it was made pursuant to an official duty to speak 
matters.  As to this point, it is hard to see why teachers should be treated 
any differently, and cases decided since the publication of Gee’s note 
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confirm this conclusion.
150
   
     Nevertheless, it is certainly true that the classroom work environment 
differs from the work environment of most public employees in that it is 
not only expressive, but also often spontaneous.  Good teachers look for 
“teachable moments” and may adjust their speech on the fly in response to 
such moments based on their own professional judgment.  Just as it would 
be unfair to judge the action of a police officer which turns out later to 
have been a violation of the Constitution based on a standard of which the 
officer could not have been aware at the time,
151
 it would be the height of 
unfairness to revoke a teacher’s First Amendment protections because the 
teacher uttered speech that later was determined to be in conflict with a 
job duty of which the teacher could not have been precisely aware at the 
time.  So, both Welner and Gee are certainly correct that the proper 
approach should be based on elements of notice (or at least constructive 
notice), and that ex post facto “official duties” not to speak should not be 
the basis for regulating teacher classroom speech.   
     But to succeed, any solution must work within the categorical approach 
to employee speech that the Supreme Court obviously favors and shows 
no sign of jettisoning.
152
  If a teacher cannot claim First Amendment 
protection over speech she utters “pursuant to [her] official duties,” then 
what is necessary to bring speech under this standard?  Even in Garcetti, 
the Court indicated (also in response to the concerns of a dissenter) that 
the test for whether speech was made pursuant to official duties should not 
be a wooden one, and should be attentive to an employer’s bad-faith or 
pretextual designations of speech as being with the job duties of an 
employee.
153
  Courts since then have been especially suspicious of post 
hoc justifications for regulating public employee speech, as such post hoc 
justifications presumptively come from a place of rationalizing an 
otherwise unconstitutional decision, rather than from a place of effectively 
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and efficiently regulating a public workplace.
154
   
     This attentiveness to bad-faith, pretextual, and post hoc designation of 
duties related to speech counsels in favor of the kinds of notice-based 
approaches favored by both Welner and Gee; but the Court’s consistent 
favoring of categorical approaches to speech also counsels in favor of 
working within that paradigm.  As discussed above, as a constitutional 
matter, teachers are really no different from other public employees, many 
of whom fulfill roles that pervasively concern the public and many of 
whom perform expressive work on behalf of public entities, while also 
exercising discretion regarding that work.  But we may say that it is well 
within the rule of Garcetti to require courts to identify a specific set of 
employment duties (not general expectations) that governed a teacher’s 
speech on the date in question in the suit before applying the Garcetti 
exclusion, and to exhibit a healthy and searching skepticism as to any 
showing that an employer-defendant makes on such grounds.   
     If this is the case, then it is only a small step, and one entirely within 
the parameters of the Garcetti rule, to require that a public educational 
employer be able to show that, at the time of the speech in question, there 
was either a written policy, an oral directive, or a provable general 
understanding among employees, that the speech in question was 
prohibited.  If this is the case, then the Garcetti exclusion should apply.  If 
not, then the court should revert to the Pickering analysis.   
     Although reasonable minds may dispute whether a public employee 
can speak simultaneously as a citizen and as an employee pursuant to a job 
duty,
155
 the Court has resolved this question in favor of employees’ being 
able to occupy only one of these roles at a time when expressing 
themselves.  But that does not mean that when a public employee 
speaks—even on the job—every word uttered is uttered pursuant to an 
official duty.  Different jobs require—and prohibit—different amounts and 
kinds of speech, and the Garcetti rule acknowledges this fact.   
     Indeed, the Garcetti Court citied approvingly and reaffirmed Givhan v. 
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 See Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369 (2014) (rejecting the attempts of the State of 
Alabama to include testifying in court as part of the plaintiff’s official duties when 
testifying was something he did only on one occasion and was not part of his ordinary 
duties); Adams v. UNC-Wilmington, 640 F.3d 550 (2011) (rejecting the attempts of the 
university to include popular writings and commentary of a professor within that 
professor’s official duties because the professor was not employed to write such 
materials, and when he did, he always did so in his private capacity).   
155
See Secunda, Right-Privilege, supra note 6, at 912-13; Secunda, Federal Employees, 
supra note 6, at 123; Rhodes, supra note 57, at 1174.   
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Western Line Consolidated School District,
156
 a case in which a 
unanimous Court held to be protected under the First Amendment a school 
guidance counselor’s complaints during the work day to her superiors 
regarding alleged racial bias that she had perceived in hiring at the 
school.
157
  Although Ms. Givhan spoke at work, during work hours, and to 
her superiors about work-related matters, her speech was protected 
because it embraced a matter of public concern.   
     The Garcetti Court did not see fit to overrule that decision on the way 
to stating its holding; rather, it used Givhan as a foil to show a contrast 
with the plaintiff, Ceballos’, expression, which took the form of a legal 
memorandum authored by an attorney employed in part to author legal 
memoranda.  The natural implication of this use of Givhan is that not 
everything that one says at work or even about work is said to be pursuant 
to one’s official duties, even if one is employed in an expressive role, as 
every school guidance counselor certainly is.  Therefore, every potential 
Garcetti case requires courts to distinguish between job-required or job-
prohibited speech on one hand, and speech made while at work, but not 
required or prohibited by a job duty on the other hand.   
     In the classroom, this task is fairly simple, but certainly not pro forma.  
Although it would be useful to have data on this point, it is safe to assume 
that the vast majority of public school teacher expression in the classroom 
involves delivering content based on the approved school curriculum and 
the materials purchased in support of it; managing student behavior; and 
responding to student questions relating to the course material.  As to 
these matters, it is obvious that Garcetti would govern because every 
public school teacher is specifically employed to deliver the approved 
curricular content using the approved curricular materials, and is expected 
to manage student behavior and respond to student questions about the 
material.  But that sort of expression is also certainly not the only 
classroom expression in which a teacher engages.  And more importantly, 
it is not always clear to a teacher in the classroom just what the approved 
curriculum requires him to say or not say, or just what the expectations of 
his school, district or profession allow him to say while managing student 
behavior, or just which questions from students he may answer and how 
she may or may not frame such an answer.   
     Because much of what is said in the classroom is difficult to connect to 
the specific requirements and prohibitions of the job, courts should tread 
carefully when seeking to employ Garcetti’s “pursuant to official duties” 
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 439 U.S. 410 (1979).   
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 See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 420-21 (citing Givhan, 439 U.S. at 414). 
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test, and it would be helpful to have a way to distinguish between job-
required or job-prohibited speech and other speech made in the classroom 
that comports with the overall categorical structure of First Amendment 
jurisprudence.  In prior work, a co-author and I advanced the claim that, 
given the narrowness of the Court’s holding and the care with which 
Justice Kennedy distinguished Ceballos’ speech from that of the plaintiffs 
in Pickering and Givhan, the Garcetti “pursuant to official duties” test 
should not be satisfied unless, at the time of the challenged expression, the 
employee in question would have been legitimately subject to discipline 
under his employment contract for failing to speak.
158
  But it became clear 
to me after the publication of that work that this test, while useful, can 
only take the courts so far.  For example, it would not have worked as 
intended in the case of Ms. Mayer, who was disciplined for answering a 
student’s question on her own participation in protests.  That discipline 
was upheld under the Garcetti test because the district claimed that, in 
effect, a requirement not to answer that question was an official, 
expressive duty of Mayer’s job.159 
     In other words, the flaw in my past work on this topic was in failing to 
recognize that a duty not to speak, in many cases, is the “official duty” that 
the district claims the employee spoke “pursuant to.”  Thus, the test I 
articulated in my past work needs an update, and that update should also 
address other types of unarticulated purported “duties” to speak in a 
certain way that serve as post hoc justifications in some cases for 
retaliatory punishments.
160
  The work of the courts since Garcetti was 
decided, including the Supreme Court, provides a way forward.   
     In particular, the case of Lane v. Franks, decided in 2014, illustrates 
that the Court views the Garcetti rule as narrow and limited to facts that 
are very similar to the facts of Garcetti.  Lane involved the trial testimony 
of a former community college administrator who had discovered that one 
of his subordinates was illegally drawing a paycheck from his federally-
funded program without doing much, if any, work.
161
  He fired the 
subordinate, who was (unfortunately for Lane) an influential sitting 
member of the Alabama Legislature, and she allegedly vowed retaliation.  
After Lane testified against her in a federal criminal trial, that promised 
retaliation allegedly came when everyone in his department was laid off, 
and all were rehired thereafter except Lane. 
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 See Bauries & Schach, supra note 10.   
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 See Mayer v. Monroe, 474 F.3d 477 (7th Cir. 2007).   
160
 See Evans-Marshall v. Board of Educ., 624 F.3d 332 (6th Cir. 2011).   
161
 Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2375 (2014).   
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     In the First Amendment retaliation case that resulted, Lane claimed that 
he had been fired in direct retaliation for his testimony.  The Eleventh 
Circuit held that Lane’s testimony was speech made “pursuant to [Lane’s] 
official duties” because (drawing from an unfortunate dictum in Justice 
Kennedy’s Garcetti opinion) it “owed its existence” to Lane’s public 
employment.
162
  The Supreme Court unanimously reversed.
163
 
     In rejecting the holding of the Eleventh Circuit, the Court easily 
concluded, both in its main opinion and in a more concise concurring 
opinion authored by Justice Thomas, that testifying truthfully in a judicial 
proceeding was not even arguably one of Lane’s “ordinary job 
responsibilities” as a community college administrator.164  The Court also 
forcefully rejected the Eleventh Circuit’s “but for” test, which was based 
on the “owes its existence” dictum from Garcetti,165 explaining that no 
party had suggested that Lane’s job required him to testify in criminal 
trials.
166
    
     The interesting aspect of Lane, as compared with Garcetti, is the 
introduction of the word “ordinary” to the words “official duties” or “job 
responsibilities” expressed within the Garcetti holding.167  As at least one 
circuit court has recognized the addition of this adjective, which the 
Court’s main opinion repeated nine times, and which even the brief 
concurrence of Justice Thomas repeated another three times, and that it 
was likely deliberate, and most plausibly clarifies the truly narrow nature 
of the Garcetti exclusion.
168
   
     In Lane, the use of this phrasing obviously was meant to highlight that 
Lane was not hired as a “professional witness.”  He was an educational 
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 Lane v. Franks, 523 Fed. App’x 709, 711 (11th Cir. 2013) (citing Garcetti for the 
“owe[d] its existence” quote in support).  My prior work has identified this dictum, along 
with a few others, as introducing regrettable ambiguity to the Garcetti rule, and 
muddying the waters sufficiently to allow a great deal of mischief in the lower courts.  
See generally Bauries & Schach, supra note 10.   
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 Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2369.   
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 Id. at 2375.   
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 See Lane, 523 Fed. App’x at 711.       
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 Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2379.   
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 I am indebted to Professors Brenda Kallio and Richard Geisel for drawing my 
attention to the Court’s repeated use of this word during their presentation of their work-
in-progress, Exploring the Boundaries of First Amendment Protection for Expressions on 
Matters of Public Concern by School Personnel, at the Annual Meeting of the Education 
Law Association in 2014.   
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 See Mpoy v. Rhee, 758 F.3d 285, 295 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“In particular, the use of the 
adjective “ordinary”—which the court repeated nine times—could signal a narrowing of 
the realm of employee speech left unprotected by Garcetti”).   
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administrator whose duty to testify arose only as a result of circumstances 
that could not have been predicted.  “Ordinarily,” in other words, he 
would not have had any official duty to testify, so his expression in 
offering his testimony remained protected from post hoc punishment.   
     Applied to the classroom context, this clarified conception of the 
Garcetti exclusion suggests that prior restraint can serve a benign role in 
relation to teacher classroom speech.  Under this approach, teachers 
performing their “ordinary” teaching duties—delivering lessons, 
communicating with students about the course material, selecting 
readings, etc.—would be acting “pursuant to [their] ordinary job 
responsibilities” in the overwhelming majority of cases.  But in cases such 
as Mayer, where a teacher speaks in the classroom spontaneously on a 
topic that is ancillary to her delivery of the curriculum or management of 
student behavior, the Garcetti exclusion should apply unless she was 
given a specific prior directive not to engage in such speech, or there 
existed a prior norm of prohibition that would have been known to a 
teacher in her circumstances.   
 
Benign Prior Restraint and the Classroom Speech of Students. 
 
     In the student speech context, the categorical rule functions differently 
from the categorical rule in the teacher speech context.  Under Garcetti, 
the categorical rule exists to completely remove from the First 
Amendment’s protection speech that would otherwise be within its 
protection due to its source—the ordinary job duties of the employee.  
However, under the student speech precedent, Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier,
169
 
the categorical rule exists to determine the First Amendment forum within 
which student speech exists.  
     Tinker v. Des Moines and its “materially and substantially disrupts” test 
applies presumptively to student speech within schools.  Courts therefore 
presumptively treat schools as limited public forums, limited by the 
speakers who are allowed to participate (students and teachers), but 
limited in what may be discussed only based on the prevention or 
cessation of material and substantial disruption to the school’s operations.  
But Hazelwood places an important limitation on that presumptive 
classification—where the speech in question occurs in furtherance of a 
curricular or co-curricular activity that “bears the imprimatur of the 
school” (i.e., is required or authorized by it), school officials may regulate 
the speech as long as the regulation in question is “reasonably related to 
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legitimate pedagogical concerns.”  Because the classroom is always a 
curricular venue that bears the school’s imprimatur, courts generally apply 
the Hazelwood test to the classroom speech of students,
170
 and such 
application certainly comports with the Hazelwood decision.
171
   
     But here again, the Hazelwood test would seem to cross the line from 
reasonable in light of school realities, to unreasonable and unfair, where it 
is applied in a post hoc manner to silence speech that, while not falling 
under any prior restraint in state, district, school, or classroom policy, 
happens to offend the individual teacher, the administration, other 
students, or some member of the public.  Not all student speech—even all 
student speech uttered in the classroom—deserves to be placed into the 
Hazelwood category.  For example, the plaintiffs in Tinker did not remove 
their armbands when they entered the classroom,
172
 and the various 
plaintiffs in the many T-shirt cases that have worked their way through the 
appellate courts under the Tinker framework have not done so either (until 
they were forced to, that is).
173
  Yet, their speech was either protected or 
unprotected based on the disruption it caused or did not cause (or that it 
was likely to cause or not cause), not whether the school had “legitimate 
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 See, e.g., Walz ex rel. Walz v. Egg Harbor Twp. Bd. of Educ., 342 F.3d 271, 277 (3d 
Cir. 2003) (relying on Hazelwood in upholding a teacher’s confiscation of pencils that a 
student sought to distribute during a classroom holiday party because they contained a 
religious message); Settle v. Dickson Cnty. Sch. Bd., 53 F.3d 152, 155-56 (6th Cir. 1995) 
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while pointing his fingers at other students during a “cops and robbers” game at recess 
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not violate [the student’s] First Amendment rights”). 
171
 See supra, notes 74-78 and accompanying text (discussing the Hazelwood Court’s 
assumption that its standard would apply in the classroom).   
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 See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 258 F. Supp. 971, 972 (S.D. Iowa 
1966) (“After being in their schools for varying lengths of time, each plaintiff was sent 
home by school officials for violating the regulation prohibiting the wearing of arm bands 
on school premises”).     
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 See, e.g., Defoe ex rel. Defoe v. Spiva, 625 F.3d 324 (6th Cir. 2010); Boroff v. Van 
Wert City Bd. of Educ., 220 F.3d 465, 468, (6th Cir 2000).   
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pedagogical concerns” in regulating it.174  Thus, merely entering the 
classroom does not have the effect of transforming the student speech 
forum—only the additional element of curricular content does.   
     Thus, in working within the categorical structure of student speech 
doctrine, an adapted rule should address the appropriate cases for treating 
student classroom speech as though it occurred within the closed 
curricular forum that permits even viewpoint discrimination, or the more 
open non-curricular school forum that looks skeptically at restrictions 
based on both viewpoint and content.  Although the student classroom 
speech context does not have the benefit of a recent Supreme Court 
decision leaning in the direction of Lane’s “ordinary job responsibilities” 
formulation, it is possible to derive directly from Hazelwood a similar 
formulation, and as in the case of teacher classroom speech, this 
formulation suggests that a prior restraint rule can serve a benign role as to 
student classroom speech.   
     In particular, Justice White’s reference, in various forms, to the ideas 
that the newspaper at issue in Hazelwood was a “regular classroom 
activity,”175 and that the teacher of the Journalism II course ordinarily 
exercised supervision over both the content and the format of the articles 
in the publication,
176
 suggests that concepts of notice were embedded 
within the Court’s decision.  Put another way, the exercise of editorial 
control over the class’s newspaper by school officials was not new or 
surprising, even though the students objected to how that editorial control 
was exercised in the particular case.
177
   
     Contrast this with a hypothetical counterfactual.  Say the students 
working on the paper are instead discussing and brainstorming the idea of 
doing a student pregnancy story, and a student sitting nearby who recently 
had a miscarriage overhears the discussion and becomes very upset.  
Reacting to the upset student’s complaint, the teacher sends the speaking 
students to the principal’s office, where they are disciplined for creating a 
“hostile work environment.”  Because the speech occurs within the 
classroom—a quintessential curricular environment—and it is in relation 
to curricular goals—selecting story ideas for the upcoming issue—it 
would seem that applying the deferential Hazelwood test would  seem 
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 See, e.g., Defoe, 625 F.3d at 332 (applying Tinker); Boroff, 220 F.3d at 468-69 
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 See, e.g., Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 268 (1988). 
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 See id. at 269 (“Respondents’ assertion that they had believed that they could publish 
‘practically anything’ in Spectrum was therefore dismissed by the District Court as 
simply ‘not credible’”).   
Volume 2 Education Law & Policy Review 2015 
128 
 
proper here.  But without notice that the mere discussion of teen 
pregnancy would violate the teacher’s behavioral expectations and lead to 
discipline, the punishment of the students would seem unfair.   
     Nevertheless, the current approach among at least some of the federal 
courts to student classroom speech would apply Hazelwood to this 
hypothetical because of the obviously curricular nature of the student 
speech.
178
  Under these cases, the fact that the speech occurred in the 
classroom and in connection with a curricular activity such as a writing 
assignment or class discussion would be enough to settle the categorical 
forum question, leading to the application of a more deferential (and 
therefore less speech-protective) standard.  Such application arguably 
would undermine the reasoning of Hazelwood itself, which, recall, placed 
importance on the “regular” nature of the official monitoring of content 
and expression on the newspaper.   
     A better approach to the categorical forum question would ask whether 
the speech in question would have been perceived by the student speakers 
(or hypothetical, reasonable students standing in their shoes) as falling 
within some restriction or prohibition deriving from the teacher’s or the 
school’s curricular or pedagogical goals or expectations (including student 
behavioral expectations).  Any such inquiry would have to depend, at least 
in part, on whether the speech in question was explicitly prohibited by a 
written school or classroom policy, or whether similar speech had led to 
discipline for other students in the past.
179
  Absent such elements of notice, 
courts should review the school’s disciplining of the speakers under the 
less deferential (and therefore more speech-protective) Tinker standard, as 
a small number of decisions have thus far.
180
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 See, e.g., W. v. Derby Unified Sch. Dist. No. 260, 206 F.3d 1358, 1366 (10th Cir. 
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 See e.g., Boim v. Fulton Cnty. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 978, 985 (11th Cir. 2007) (relying 
on Tinker in upholding the 10-day suspension of a high school student who wrote in a 
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Howell Pub. Sch. Dist., 2013 WL 3148272, at *7 & n.7 (E.D. Mich. June 19, 2013) 
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assessing whether a particular speech restriction comports with the constitutional 
guarantee of free speech”).   
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Conclusion 
 
     The augmentation of existing First Amendment standards proposed 
here does not seek to remake the landscape of First Amendment doctrine 
in the classroom.  Nor does it seek to alter the largely categorical approach 
to speech protections that exists throughout the First Amendment, and that 
clearly draws the support of most of the current Supreme Court.
181
  Rather, 
working within the categorical structure that the Supreme Court has 
erected through its decisions in Garcetti and Hazelwood, the proposal set 
forth in this article makes the case for appending a limited notice element 
to the categorical inquiry that precedes judicial application of the least 
speech protective standards that apply to student and teacher speech. 
     These least protective standards have in several cases been seen as 
applicable generally to speech made in the classroom environment, 
without regard to any notice that the speakers in question might have had 
that their targeted speech would have been subject to discipline or 
regulation.  Correcting this lack of notice through a benign rule requiring 
prior restraints as a precursor to the application of the completely 
deferential Garcetti “official duties” exclusion and the very deferential 
Hazelwood “legitimate pedagogical concern” test would not solve all of 
the problems inherent in those decisions or satisfy their many critics, but 
would impose an element of fairness on their application to the ad hoc 
punishment and suppression of speech made by teachers and students—
the main participants in the vital and ongoing dialog of the public school 
classroom.    
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